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Abstract and Introduction 
Governing transnational corporate behaviour through traditional regulatory design is 
a challenging objective that has been canvassed in much academic literature.  
Difficulties arise as, inter alia, transnational corporations make extensive use of 
regulatory arbitrage and corporate structures in order to avoid or mitigate the reach 
of legal and regulatory governance. Moreover, international soft law standards that 
encourage multinational corporations to be more responsible are not always effective 
or enforceable. Against this context, we explore an emerging regulatory trend in 
corporate regulation that has the potential to overcome some of the perceived 
limitations in the modern regulatory governance of transnational corporate groups.  
There is an intensifying trend in adopting procedural regulatory strategies for 
corporations. This involves prescribing various control systems and processes that 
corporations have to institute, such as compelling them to develop due diligence 
requirements within their commercial operations. This trend is not entirely new, and 
fits within the regulation theory framework of ‘new governance’,1 such as 
‘management-based regulation’2 or ‘meta-regulation’.3 However the changes we 
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1 See Cristie Ford, “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation” 
(2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 1; Robert F Weber, ‘New Governance, Financial 
Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital 
Adequacy Regulation’ (2010) 62 Administrative Law Review 783; Julia Black, ‘Paradoxes and 
Failures:”New Governance” Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 1037. 
2 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 691. 
3 Sharon Gilad, “It Runs in the Family: Meta-regulation and its Siblings” (2010) 4 Regulation and 
Governance 485; Christine Parker, The Open Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000). On meta-regulation within the context of the wider corporate social responsibility debate see: 
Christine Parker, ‘Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility,’ in 
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observe are that: such procedural regulatory strategies are becoming more 
prescriptive, more widespread and targeted at individual and organisational 
behaviour. We suggest this is a new milestone in ‘new governance’ design that we 
call ‘procedural legalisation’. Procedural legalisation is being adopted at an 
unprecedented level in financial sector and corporate regulation,4 and offers a new 
promise in changing corporate culture and behaviour, potentially addressing 
longstanding limitations with the effective regulation of corporations. We present two 
case studies to explore how procedural legalisation is applied to regulate 
corporations in both the financial sector and with anti-bribery initiatives.  
Procedural legalisation is a new trajectory in corporate regulation located at the 
intersection of regulation theory and the wider movement in law and behaviour5. Our 
account provides the theoretical anchors of this regulatory strategy, which integrates 
into regulation theory insights from organisational behaviour and corporate 
governance. Procedural legalisation advances ‘new governance’ theory by refining 
its scope and the dynamics of the relevant governance actors. However, we are 
critically mindful of the limitations suggested in organisational behaviour literature 
and of the need to support the early successes of procedural legalisation with 
effective enforcement, which is an area yet to be developed comprehensively.  
A. Challenges in Regulating Transnational Corporate Behaviour 
Corporations are separate legal personalities,6 typically engaged in private wealth 
creation for their financial stakeholders.7 However, where a business has expanded 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP, 2007), 207 – 240. 
4 With current proposals to extend this even further.  See for example the proposed adoption of the 
‘failure to prevent’ model to the facilitation of tax evasion (Criminal Finances Bill 2016-2017, ss 37-38) 
and economic crime (Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime, Call for Evidence 
(Cm 9370, 2017).  
5 Cass Sunstein and Richard H Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and 
Happiness (NY: Penguin 2009); Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony, Nudge and the Law: A 
European Perspective (Modern Studies in European Law) (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015); Alberto 
Alemanno, ‘A Behavioural Approach to Health Promotion: Informing the Global NCD Agenda with 
Behavioural Insights’ (2014) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475805; Frederic St Martin, ‘Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Canadian Whistleblowing Law’ (2014) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2635641. Our 
article however focuses on the issue of regulation and corporate compliance. 
6 Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22. 
7 The shareholder centric view of the firm has become a dominant one, led by theories of 
organisational efficiency and the agency-based paradigm of the firm. Armen A Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation” (1972) 62 The American 
Economic Rev 777; Oliver Williamson, “Corporate Governance” (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1197; 
Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26 Journal of 
Law and Economics 301; Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
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to acquire a global, multi-jurisdictional footprint, an anomaly arises between its legal 
characterisation and its social and political importance. The global business is 
usually structured as a collection of separate corporate legal personalities loosely 
called a ‘corporate group’ but, as a whole, it is strategically connected and could 
have important influence in a number of economies and societies.8 
The transnational corporate group is able to exploit the comparative advantages of 
different jurisdictions offering different resources, primary materials and services. 
Further, it is also situated in the centre of a web of global business-relations with 
external entities including suppliers and distributors.9 The transnational corporate 
group may indeed be described as an extensive and somewhat amorphous beast in 
terms of its power, influence and arguably, responsibility. However, the scope of its 
legal responsibility may be surprisingly limited for its global profile for three key 
reasons.10  
First, each separate legal entity in the group bears its own legal responsibility.11 This 
has given rise to a common corporate structuring strategy known as ‘asset 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economics 305; Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(1991). Many jurisdictions have now provided for exceptions to this shareholder-centric view of the 
firm.  For example, the B-Corporation in the United States and the Community Interest Company in 
the United Kingdom.  Moreover, there is, of course, a large body of literature that challenges the 
legitimacy of adopting such a narrow view of the objective of the firm.  The literature is too vast to cite 
in full but key works in this field include: Edward Freeman, “A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern 
Corporation” reproduced in Max BE Clarkson ed, The Corporation and Its Stakeholders (Univ of 
Toronto Press 1998) at 125; Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, “A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Virginia. L. Rev. 247; Thomas Donaldson and Lee E Preston, ‘The 
Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy of 
Management Review 65; John E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (OUP 1993) at 402-
423; Andrew Keay, The Corporate Objective (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2010); Colin Mayer, Firm 
Commitment (Oxford: OUP 2013). 
8John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993), generally. 
Also see Janet Dine, ‘Transnationals out of Control’ in Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge 
University Press 2000, 2006), Joel Bakan, The Corporation - The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and 
Power (London: Penguin, 2003). 
9 For example: see chapter 1, Henry WC Yeung, Transnational Corporations and Business Networks 
(Oxford: Routledge 1998). 
10 Larry Cata Backer, ‘The Autonomous Global Enterprise: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond 
Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality’ (2006) 41 Tulsa Law Journal at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880730, expressing concern for the ability of 
transnational corporations to have such expansive reach and yet remain relatively autonomous from 
state-based regimes of law. 
11 That is, ‘each company in a group of companies … is a separate legal entity possessed of separate 
legal rights and liabilities’ The Albazero [1977] AC 774, 807 (Roskill LJ). 
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partitioning’,12 allowing transnational corporate groups to manage their risks and 
carry out regulatory arbitrage between the jurisdictions of their operations.13 As 
corporate regulation is national in character, transnational corporate groups are able 
to use subsidiary structures or offshore incorporations14 to avoid regulation. Although 
some regulations are capable of extra-territoriality, there remain concerns with 
regard to their legality and proportionality, as well as the efficacy of their 
enforcement.15 Extra-territorial regulation can to an extent bring liability home to the 
parent corporation, such as under the US Alien Torts Act, but lessons from 
enforcement of that Act16 indicate that there are difficulties in securing evidence and 
enforcement. 
Secondly, prevailing regulatory strategies for corporations face certain challenges in 
controlling corporate behaviour due to their design limitations. Commentators point 
out that regulation is often designed in terms of ‘outcomes’ or ‘technologies’.17 
Outcomes-based regulation prescribes certain ends that corporations need to 
achieve or avoid. Technologies-based regulation prescribes that corporations must 
adopt a certain methodology, which proxies for the achievement of certain outcomes. 
An outcomes-based regulation for example could prescribe standards in product 
safety or occupier’s liability. A technologies-based regulation could be found in the 
mandatory requirement for companies to appoint qualified external auditors to 
assure their financial statements, in order to achieve the outcome of accurate 
financial reporting to the markets. 
                                                          
12 On which see: Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 
(2000) 44 European Economic Review 807, 810-812. 
13 Often transnational corporations use thinly capitalised subsidiaries to undertake risky overseas 
operations so that the other corporate members of the group will be immune from the losses suffered 
by that subsidiary. The shifting of liability onto the parent company, a process called ‘lifting of the 
corporate veil’ is highly difficult to achieve in UK civil litigation, see Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 
Ch 433; 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER, 929; Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. There is 
no doctrine of ‘enterprise liability’ in the UK for corporate groups as a whole although some extent of 
such liability is recognised in the US and Germany.   See Meredith Dearborn, ‘Enterprise Liability: 
Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups’ (2009) 97 California Law Review 195. 
14 Although tax and regulatory avoidance is increasingly being pared down by international and extra-
territorial initiatives, see Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The 
Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order’, 
Connecticut Journal of International Law (2016), forthcoming. 
15 See for example, Joanne Scott, ‘The New EU Extraterritoriality’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law 
Review 1343. 
16 For example: see C Forcece, ‘ATCA’s Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and 
the Alien Tort Claims Act’ (2001) 26 Yale Journal of International Law 487. 
17 See for example: Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1982). 
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Regulatory design limitations are arguably augmented where transnational corporate 
groups are concerned. ‘Outcomes-based’ regulation may not adequately control 
corporate behaviour where some outcomes cannot be directly attributed to distinct 
legal personalities in the group, or are broad-based and difficult to define as specific 
legal duties.  For example, whilst certain corporations can be made liable for outputs 
or conduct that can be directly attributed to them such as unsafe products or 
breaches of consumer data protection, it is more challenging to establish liability for 
remote associations such as the human rights standards of its suppliers, even if 
highly influential and close associations with suppliers is established.18 Indeed, 
transnational corporate groups are able to design structures in such a way as to 
make certain responsibilities difficult to pin down. In terms of prescribing the 
mandatory adoption of certain technologies, such technologies may not be 
appropriate across the board for the corporate sector. Technologies-based 
regulation also needs to be proportionate to the cost of compliance for corporations, 
or regulatory arbitrage would be explored by them. The mandatory adoption of 
certain regulatory technologies need not achieve a high correlation with desirable 
outcomes.  
At a higher level, legal and regulatory regimes for corporations are designed to 
change corporate behaviour in order to align with certain public interests and social 
outcomes. But transnational corporations could become inured to litigation and 
regulatory fines, which are regarded as a cost for doing business.19 Thus, legal and 
regulatory regimes may continue to be peripheral to corporate culture and the 
incentives of individuals managing and working in the transnational corporate group.  
Finally, the limitations of legal and regulatory regimes are also to a large extent 
attributable to how corporate law theory frames the nature of the corporation, which 
we explore in Section C. In general, Pendras argues that the corporation has been 
able to manipulate the definition of its legal nature as a political development and not 
as an outworking of normative conceptions in theory or law.20 In doing so, the 
corporation has been able to determine politically the extent of its rights and shape 
the scope and objectives of corporate regulation.  
In this light, international norms have been developed to encourage transnational 
corporations to behave responsibly not only within their corporate structure but also 
more widely within their network of global business-centred relations.21 Further, there 
                                                          
18 As causation for harm may not be established in law. 
19 See: Cynthia A. Williams, ‘Corporate Compliance With the Law in the Era of Efficiency,’ (1997) 76 
North Carolina Law Review 1265. 
20 Mark Pendras, ‘Law and the Political Geography of US Corporate Regulation’ (2011) 15 Regulation, 
Space and Polity 1. 
21 For example: UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations (2003) superseded 
by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) at 
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have been nascent discussions of making transnational corporations legal persons 
within the meaning of international law for standard-setting and enforcement 
purposes.22 The pros and cons of soft law approaches in the international 
governance of business is a well-trodden area - there are optimists who see potential 
in the soft law of international governance as constituting a quasi-legal or even 
constitutional order for transnational corporations, and there are those more 
sceptical of the effectiveness of such regimes in changing corporate culture and 
behaviour.23 After all, international norms are not enforceable unless adopted in 
state-based regulation. Further, corporations could even use associations with 
international norms as part of their branding appeal while adhering superficially to 
their spirit.24  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.  It is arguable 
that the latter may be subject to greater legalisation than its soft law predecessor and the following 
soft law examples. Also see the UN Global Compact, at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/.  
22 See for example: Nicola Jägers, ‘The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation Under 
International Law’, in Michael K. Addo ed., Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations 259, 262 (1999); Fleur E Johns, ‘The Invisibility of the Transnational 
Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal Theory’ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law 
Review 893. 
23 We do not embark on a comprehensive literature review here, but see for example those who view 
more optimistically the governance of transnational corporations by international norms or soft law, 
see Larry Catá Backer, ‘Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) V Das Air and Global 
Witness V Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the 
Regulation of Multinational Corporations’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 258; 
‘From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of 
Multinational Corporations’ (2008) 39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 591, ‘Governance 
Without Government: An Overview and Application of Interactions Between Law-State and 
Governance-Corporate Systems’ (2010) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568934;  Peer Zumbansen, ‘Defining the Space 
of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism’ (2011) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934044; Grahame F Thompson, 
Constitutionalisation of the Global Corporate Sphere (Oxford: OUP 2014). For a sceptical opinion see 
Alice de Jonge,  Transnational Corporations and International Law (Cheltenham; Edward Elgar 2011); 
Giovanni Distefano, ‘The Regulation of Transnational Corporations: Some Observations from the 
Standpoint from Public International Law, The Mirage of a New International Economic Order’ (2011) 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1889274. (Supporters of ‘harder’ law 
governance include Ben Bowling and JWE Sheptycki, ‘Global Policing and Transnational Rule with 
Law’ (2015) 6 Transnational Legal Theory 141; John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business 
Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) generally; David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global 
Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 ANNALS of the Academy of Political Science 12; John 
Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
24 On the use of ‘symbolic’ structures to signify compliance, without meaningfully observing the spirit 
of legislation see: Laruen B. Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational 
Mediation of Civil Rights Law,’ (1992) 97(6) American Journal of Sociology 1531. 
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In light of the difficulties in suing or regulating the distinct legal personalities of the 
transnational corporate group, we critically explore what can be achieved by 
procedural legalisation as a new form of corporate regulation. Procedural legalisation 
targets the incentives and behaviour of micro-constituents within an organisation in a 
procedural but prescriptive manner. This is for the purposes of changing corporate 
behaviour or culture more widely. 
In Section B, we explain ‘procedural legalisation’ and refer to two case studies, the 
regulation of financial sector firms and anti-bribery regulation in the UK respectively, 
to show how procedural legalisation has been deployed. In Section C, we argue that 
procedural legalisation, which introduces regulatory intervention within the order of 
the corporation is not defeated by theories of the corporate personhood, and is 
consistent with corporate law. We argue in Section D that procedural legalisation is 
founded upon ‘new governance’ approaches in modern regulation theory but is 
poised to overcome the latter’s weaknesses. In Section E, we highlight the 
importance of integrating organisational behaviour research into procedural 
legalisation and discuss its achievements and limitations. In Section F, we conclude 
by identifying the future research directions for procedural legalisation, in particular 
its ‘ex post’ or output legitimacy. 
B. Trending: Procedural Legalisation by National Regulators 
We observe that regulators are increasingly introducing regulatory duties with 
respect to how corporations may be organised, structured or governed. This means 
that regulation prescribes certain aspects of organisational or governance order 
within corporations or introduces incentives or personal responsibility for certain 
persons or office-holders. Such regulation is aimed at changing behaviour on the 
part of micro-constituents within the corporation, whether individuals or particular 
groupings. It is anticipated that such behavioural changes at micro level may 
facilitate changes in corporate behaviour as a whole.  
The direct regulation of internal order within the corporation is not an entirely new 
approach. An early semblance of this regulatory approach is found in the unpopular 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 200225 where prescriptive regulation, including  reposing 
specific responsibility on the Chief Financial Officer of listed companies to sign off 
financial statements,26 is designed to make the CFO responsible for improving the 
integrity in financial reporting. Further, procedure-based regulation has been used in 
health and safety regulation, such as the institution of health and safety officers. In 
doing so, regulation has been used in areas of responsibility that are at risk of being 
                                                          
25 Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance’ 
(2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1521. 
26 Section 302, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002), also 
known as the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act". 
 8 
externalised or neglected by corporations, were it not for the imposition of regulatory 
obligations.27   
Procedure-based regulation is different from outcomes-based or technologies-based 
regulation, which are two prevailing regulatory techniques. Technologies-based 
regulation compels the adoption of certain methodologies by corporations such as 
standards of measurement for recycling, for example. In contrast, procedure-based 
regulation focuses on certain qualities of organisational or decision-making 
frameworks, such as independence and accountability. Outcomes-based regulation 
focuses on the achievement of certain ends, whereas procedure-based regulation 
focuses on the means, usually as a proxy for a range of ends, possibly because 
outcomes are hard to measure, for example, a healthy corporate culture. Procedural 
obligations provide regulators with relatively clear indicators for determining non-
compliance (and criteria for enforcement).28 Enforcement on the basis of such non-
compliance may be more easily justified than for alleged breaches of substantive 
obligations which require proof of failure of care, proof of harm and causation, 
matters not always easy to establish. Breaches of procedural requirements are often 
clearer-cut and can be susceptible to being framed as matters for strict liability. 
One question that may immediately arise is whether procedural legalisation would be 
effective in securing corporate behaviour that achieves substantive objectives such 
as being environmentally sustainable. There is some empirical evidence from the 
US29 on how procedure-based regulation targeted at micro-constituents beneath the 
corporate veil has changed corporate behaviour and reduced regulatory breaches. 
We are of the view that this approach presents great promise in some difficult and 
complex areas for corporate regulation.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there is 
a key weakness in regulatory design and empirical research that examines the ex 
post or output legitimacy of procedural legalisation is important.  
(i) Procedural Legalisation in Regulating Financial Sector Firms 
The background to procedural legalisation in financial regulation is the need to 
achieve the regulatory objective of financial stability.30 Financial stability is a 
                                                          
27 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37 Law and Society Review 691. 
28 In a way procedural legalisation can achieve enforcement in areas where securing compliance with 
substantive outcomes may be difficult and hence procedural enforcement results in an achievement 
of proxy justice or deterrence, see analogous reasoning in Leora Bilsky and Natalie R Davidson, ‘A 
Process-Oriented Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations’ (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302240. 
29 Lori Snyder Bennear, ‘Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence from State 
Pollution Prevention Programs’ (2007) 26 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 327. 
30 See chapter 1, Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation 
(Oxford: Routledge 2014) and cites within. 
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collective goal which is perceived to be achieved if all firms are subject to common 
standards in microprudential regulation.31 However, as post-crisis diagnoses after 
the global financial crisis 2007-9 have revealed, individual firms indulged in perverse 
incentives, flawed governance structures and weak organisation in order to 
undermine the spirit of microprudential regulation, ultimately contributing to firms’ 
failure32 and bringing about the collective financial crisis. Individual firms do not have 
incentives to act in a manner that promotes collective good33 at the expense of their 
self-interest. Hence, regulators now consider it vital to govern the behaviour of micro-
constituents micro-constituents in financial firms.34 EU legislation and the UK 
regulators, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) have introduced procedural legalisation to govern an expansive 
range of organisational structures from specialist departments to the Board, and 
incentives that affect individual behaviour such as remuneration. These are to be 
viewed as essential pieces of the larger matrix of regulation that is aimed at 
achieving financial stability.35 
Regulating Internal Control in Financial Firms 
All financial institutions, in fact all corporations, install systems of internal control. 
These systems comprise of self-checking procedures in order to deal with 
compliance with external regulations and internal rules, detecting wrongdoing or 
misconduct and protecting corporate assets from being misused or 
misappropriated.36 Internal control in a financial institution is led and overseen by the 
compliance, risk management and internal audit departments. 
                                                          
31 Microprudential regulation is extensively discussed in other literature, for example, see Simon 
Gleeson, International Regulation of Banking: Capital and Risk Requirements (2nd ed, Oxford: OUP 
2012). 
32 D Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations’ (26 November 2009) at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf; Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A 
Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March 2009) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf; Howard Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to 
Blame? (Cambridge: Polity Press 2010). 
33 SL Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193. 
34 Surveyed comprehensively in Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulating (from) the Inside: The Legal Framework for 
Internal Control at Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Hart 2015). 
35 For an overview of the post-crisis reforms aimed at enhancing financial stability, see Mads Andenas 
and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford; Routledge 2014). 
36 KPMG, Internal Control: A Practical Guide (1999) at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/kpmg_internal_control_practical_guide.pdf. 
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In the wake of the global financial crisis, a number of financial institutions were found 
to have put their risk management departments under extreme pressure to condone 
excessive risk-taking, in order to push the boundaries of microprudential regulation.37 
Further, financial institutions have been found to be liable for strings of market 
misconduct and consumer mis-selling. 38 Market misconduct such as the foreign 
exchange manipulation scandals also involved collusive behaviour between 
individuals across different financial institutions.39 Poor compliance culture and weak 
internal control are not isolated problems in firms but systemic problems in sectoral 
culture. 
Regulators have now taken the step of directly prescribing how the internal control 
functions of banks and financial institutions, ie how the Compliance, Risk 
Management and Internal Audit departments should be structured, responsibilised 
and governed.40 First, the three functions are to be protected in their independence 
so that they may be able to objectively gatekeep the financial institution from wrong-
doing. The tenure, accountability and career progression of personnel should be 
separate from business interests. The accountability of the three functions lies 
                                                          
37 Gabriele Sabato, “Financial Crisis: Where Did Risk Management Fall?” (2009) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1460762; Annette Mikes, “Risk Management at 
Crunch Time: Are Chief Risk Officers Compliance Champions or Business Partners?” (2008) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138615; Hans J Blommestein, Lex Hoogduin 
and JJW Peeters, “Uncertainty and Risk Management after the Great Moderation: The Role of Risk 
(Mis)Management by Financial Institutions” (2009) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489826; Michel Crouhy, “Risk Management 
Failures During the Financial Crisis” in Robert W Kolb (ed), Lessons from the Financial Crisis (New 
Jersey: John Wiley, 2010) at 283; Elizabeth Sheedy, “The Future of Risk Modelling” in Robert W Kolb 
(ed), Lessons from the Financial Crisis (New Jersey: John Wiley, 2010) at 301; Frank Partnoy, “On 
Rogues, Risk-taking and Restoring Trust in Banks”, The Financial Times (23 Sep 2011). 
38 The misselling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) to retail customers, see FSA, ‘The 
Assessment and Redress of Payment Protection Insurance Complaints: Feedback on the Further 
Consultation in CP10/6 and Final Handbook Text’ (August 2010) PS10/12 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_12.pdf; FSA Handbook DISP 3; Eilis Ferran, ‘Regulatory 
Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance Mis-Selling Scandal in the UK’ (2012) European 
Business Organisation Law Review 248. On the misselling of interest rate swaps to small businesses, 
see FSA, ‘FSA Confirms Full Review of Interest Rate Swap Misselling’ (31 January 2013) at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/other_publications/interest-rate-swaps. On the manipulation of the 
London Inter-bank Offered Rate, see ‘UBS Fined £1.5bn for LIBOR Rigging’, BBC News (19 
December 2012); ‘LIBOR Scandal: RBS Fined £390m’, BBC News (6 February 2013); ‘Foreign 
Exchange: The Big Fix’, Financial Times (12 Nov 2013) discussing 15 banks including JP Morgan in 
potential enforcement action against foreign exchange fixing; ‘Big Banks Slapped With £2.6bn FX 
'Rate Rigging' Fines But Will They Ever Learn?’, Forbes.com (15 Nov 2014); Martin DD Evans, ‘Forex 
Trading and the WMR Fix’ (2014) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487991. 
39 See ‘Forex scandal: How to rig the market’, BBC News (20 May 2015). 
40 Argued in Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulating from the Inside: The Legal Framework for Internal Control at 
Banks and Financial Institutions (Oxford: Hart 2015). 
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directly to the Board of directors and not to the Chief Executive Officers so that their 
independence may not be compromised. Next, the three functions are to be headed 
by sufficiently senior officers in order not to be intimidated by senior executives who 
represent business interests. In particular, the institution of the Chief Risk Officer41 
was recommended after the Walker Review of Corporate Governance in Banks and 
Financial Institutions in 2009.42 The three functions are assured adequate resources 
and empowerment such as access to firm-wide information in order to carry out their 
roles, some of which are now explicitly prescribed so that financial institutions cannot 
marginalise the three functions from key business decisions. For example the risk 
management function must be consulted on for marketing of new products,43 and the 
compliance function must have oversight of activities in firms such as benchmarks 
submission.44   
 
Procedural legalisation now intervenes directly into organisational design in order to 
change the behaviour of internal governance functions, influencing firm behaviour 
overall to be consistent with regulatory goals.  
Although the direct regulation of internal control functions in a financial institution 
goes ‘beneath the corporate veil’ and is intended to affect corporate behaviour, such 
targeted regulation at micro-constituents can also achieve effects beyond the 
corporation. This is because internal control policies and systems are not always 
confined narrowly to distinct corporate entities and may encompass the entire group 
structure. Inter-dependencies and links in group-wide systems are not uncommon as 
a matter of strategic and operational efficiency.45 Further, as financial institutions 
keenly affect and mimic each other46 due to interconnections in transactions, 
changes in the behaviour of micro-constituents in individual corporations can 
influence the behaviour of those who interact with them. Such cascading and 
                                                          
41 PRA Rulebook Risk Control, FCA Handbook, SYSC 21. 
42 D Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations’ (26 November 2009) at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. 
43 EBA Guidelines 2011. 
44 FCA Handbook MAR 8.2. 
45 For example see Chandler v Cape [2012] EWCA Civ 525. It may be argued that in response policy 
and systems ‘segregation’ could occur so as to limit the impact of regulatory permeation. However 
that is a trade-off that the firms would have to determine, between strategic and operational efficiency 
and the self-interest of avoiding regulation. 
46 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘Financial Regulation, Behavioural Finance, and the Global Credit Crisis: In 
Search of a New Regulatory Model’ (2008) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132665. 
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permeating effects of behavioural changes at a micro level could be rather powerful, 
traversing the boundaries within corporate groups and beyond.47 
For example, several American and European banks have announced the review of 
their business relations with correspondent banks in African countries,48 due to 
money laundering risks. In so doing, these banks may be responding to a need to 
improve their compliance culture, partly driven by the introduction of direct regulation 
of internal control functions.49 In such a review, the changes in these banks’ 
compliance culture may in turn affect the practices in their correspondent banks, 
creating pressure for those banks to improve their anti-money laundering compliance. 
At a broad level procedural legalisation has the potential to create powerful rippling 
effects where the transnational governance of corporate groups and business 
networks have proved challenging. Of course one could argue that these banks’ 
behaviour is defensive in nature and creates obstacles for international financial 
flows and the access of developing countries to finance and capital. This point is 
taken up on the international platform as the Financial Stability Board50 examines 
how best to help correspondent banks improve their due diligence procedures. The 
impact of behavioural change on the part of one corporation upon its wider network 
highlights the potential of procedural legalisation as a powerful regulatory strategy.  
Next, we discuss corporate governance structures that support a stronger internal 
control culture at financial institutions, and institutional structures such as 
whistleblowing. Regulation has also introduced incentives to govern individual 
behaviour, in the form of personal responsibility and liability regimes in relation to 
firm compliance with substantive obligations, and the regulation of remuneration.  
  
Regulation of Corporate Governance  
Mandatory prescription for corporate governance is now introduced to support the 
effectiveness of internal control functions. For example, the EU Capital 
Requirements Directive makes it a Board responsibility to ensure adequate risk 
management systems in the firm.51 Further, commentators52 revealed that many 
                                                          
47 In this way, such changes could occur in a similar way to the norm cascades that Sunstein 
discusses when changing wider social norms, on which see: Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive 
Function of Law,’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2021; Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Social 
Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96(4) Columbia Law Review 903. 
48 ‘Poor Correspondents’, The Economist (14 June 2014). 
49 partly driven by intensive FCA enforcement too, for eg FCA’s levy of £7.6 million fine on Standard 
Chartered for breaches of money laundering risk management. 
50 Financial Stability Board, FSB Action Plan to Assess and Address the Decline in Correspondent 
Banking (19 Dec 2016). 
51 Art 88, CRD IV Directive. 
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bank Boards lacked leadership in key strategic and risk decisions during the global 
financial crisis. This revelation has resulted in regulatory response in governing  
certain aspects of corporate governance, such as Board composition and the 
dedication of directors’ time.  
In terms of Board composition, the nomination committee of the Board must ensure 
that Board members bring a diverse slate of skills suitable for the business model,53 
and gender diversity is encouraged by a mandatory reporting obligation on gender 
ratio.54 Further, firms of a certain scale or size need to institute a governing risk 
committee55 on its Board in order to set risk appetite, frame policies for adequate risk 
management and oversight. Directors are also subject to prescriptive rules on time 
commitment. They are prohibited from taking more than one other executive 
appointment or 4 other non-executive appointments if appointed as an executive 
director to a bank Board.56  
Although not necessarily in response to the more severe corporate governance 
requirements imposed, we observe that a number of bank Boards in the UK have for 
example, experienced rather frequent turnovers of late.57 Directors seem to be less 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
52 For example: see Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison, and Joel Shapiro, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis?’ (June 2011) Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Staff Report No 502 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880009>. 
53 Above. 
54 Above. Gender diversity may have an arguable connection with prudence in risk management, 
although this is still tenuous. In the financial sector, research on the effect of the male hormone 
testosterone on risk-taking on trading floors  may have become rather important to the cause of 
championing for diversity. Perhaps the ‘moderating’ influences of female directors on bank and 
financial institution Boards would be necessary for overall risk governance. See John M Coates, Mark 
Gurnell and Zoltan Sarnyai, ‘From Molecule to Market: Steroid Hormones and Financial Risk-Taking’ 
(2010) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 331; John M 
Coates and Joe Herbert, ‘Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London Trading Floor’ 
(2008) 105 Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 6167; John Coates, The Hour Between 
Dog and Wolf. Risk Taking, Gut Feelings, and the Biology of Boom and Bust (New York: Penguin 
Press 2012). Further, it is believed that gender diversity on Boards would enhance critical and 
constructive challenge in Board discussions. See Melsa Ararat, Mine H Aksu and Ayse Tansel Cetin, 
‘The Impact of Board Diversity on Boards' Monitoring Intensity and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange’ (April 2010), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572283 on Turkish banks; MA Gulamhussen 
and Silva Maria Santos, ‘Women in Bank Boardrooms and Their Influence on Performance and Risk-
Taking’ (April, 2010) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615663 argues that 
gender diversity on bank Boards improves risk moderation. 
55 Art 88, CRD IV Directive, transposed in the PRA Rulebook, Risk Control. 
56 Above. 
57 For example, Barclays’ Chief Executive Bob Diamond resigned in the wake of the LIBOR 
manipulation scandal after the global financial crisis and since  appointed new Chief Executives in 
2012 and 2015 respectively. Deutsche Bank has also had 2 turnovers of Chief Executives between 
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able to entrench power or be able to be complacent in a new environment that 
subjects them to direct regulatory governance and scrutiny. Such may be an 
indication in shifts in the financial sector’s corporate cultures. 
Regulating Other Organisational Frameworks or Structures 
In order to ensure that regulatory prescriptions for internal control and corporate 
governance are not marginalised by firms in their implementation, the European 
Banking Authority has endorsed enterprise-wide risk management for banks.58 The 
enterprise-wide risk management model is one where risk management is led at the 
strategic level by the Board, rolls out into all aspects of business and operations and 
is considered holistically. Risk management is not carried out in isolated silos in 
business units and is integrated into all aspects of information flows and oversight. 
With such endorsement, it would be difficult for banking groups to deliberately 
segregate their risk management or internal control policies in order to marginalise 
internal control functions. 
Further, the UK has introduced mandatory organisational structures that support the 
work of internal control functions, for example, by compelling financial institutions to 
install a senior person responsible for maintaining a whistleblowing function59 so that 
whistleblowers and informers are encouraged and offered a robust degree of 
protection60 in order to overcome fears of retaliation. The reform is a result of 
implementation of the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Commission in 
2013.61 We observe for example that whistleblowers are coming forward to report 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2012 and 2016. Standard Chartered replaced its Chief Executive in the wake of the massive fine 
handed out by the FCA for failing to manage its anti money laundering risks, and HSBC is in the 
process of replacing its CEO and Chairman after being highlighted for failures in managing anti 
money laundering systems and controls. 
58 European Banking Authority, EBA’s Guidelines on Internal Governance (27 September 2011). This 
continues to be endorsed in the Authority’s consultation paper in 2016 on revising the above 
Guidelines, see 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1639914/Consultation+Paper+on+Guidelines+on+intern
al+governance+%28EBA-CP-2016-16%29.pdf at para 130, under Section 13. 
59 PRA Rulebook, General Organisational Requirements (para 2.9). 
60 To this end the government is generally consulting on legal protection for whistleblowers in general 
and not limited to the financial sector, see Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
Whistleblowing Framework: Call for Evidence (12 July 2013) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence.  
61 House of Lords and House of Commons, Changing Banking for Good (Report of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards) (12 June 2013) at Vol II, Chapter 6 generally at para 786; 792-
797. 
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discomfort with financial institution culture and poor conduct.62  This could be an 
early sign of changing corporate culture brought about by procedural legalisation. 
Regulating Individuals - Remuneration 
Next, regulatory prescriptions have been introduced to control bankers’ remuneration, 
as the industry practices in relation to variable remuneration have been recognised 
to encourage perverse incentives for individuals.63 Variable remuneration (bonuses), 
which form a large part of bankers’ remuneration, are largely based on short-termist 
performance metrics, therefore incentivising individuals to engage in risk-taking 
behaviour and disregarding longer term consequences for the financial institution as 
a whole. 
EU legislation now extends control over a wide range of bankers’ remuneration, from 
Board level down to ‘material risk takers’ whose function affect their banks’ key risk 
profiles or who earn a high level of remuneration commensurate with senior 
executives.64  Such legislation, also transposed by the UK’s PRA, includes a 
framework for award of remuneration based on longer-term and holistic metrics, and 
targeted control over bonuses.65 In particular, control over bonuses severely limits 
guaranteed bonuses, and caps bonuses to 100% of fixed remuneration.66 Further, 
40% of bonuses must be deferred, and not to vest too soon, and at least half must 
be payable in securities-based instruments.67 Bonuses are also subject to malus and 
clawback over substantially long periods, i.e. up to 10 years for senior executives 
and up to 7 years if certain conditions of wrong-doing, non-compliance or downturn 
in the firm’s financial fortunes are satisfied.68 
Governing individual incentives through remuneration remains a challenge, as 
manifested in the Wells Fargo scandal in 2016 that revealed staff setting up fictitious 
bank accounts because their bonuses were determined on the basis of the volume of 
                                                          
62 ‘Lloyds Bank whistleblowers claim old-style methods and bullying tactics are returning to some high 
street branches (24 Nov 2015) at http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/saving/article-3330155/Lloyds-
Bank-whistleblowers-claim-old-style-methods-bullying-tactics-returning-high-street-
branches.html#ixzz43IXPZHdz.  
63 Capital Requirements IV Directive 2013 at Arts 92-95, PRA Rulebook, Remuneration. 
64 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 supplementing Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff 
whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile. 
65 Capital Requirements IV Directive 2013 at Arts 92-95, PRA Rulebook, Remuneration. 
66 Above. 
67 Above. 
68 PRA Rulebook, Remuneration, para 15.19. 
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new accounts acquired.69 Further, this is an area that continues to be challenged by 
regulatory arbitrage as the industry attempts to create pay innovations that avoid 
regulation.70 The difficulty with governing remuneration lies in the incompatibility of 
regulation with the competitive needs of banks and financial institutions for global 
talent.71 It may also be argued that the prescriptive extent of EU legislation such as 
the bonus cap goes too far in shaping individual incentives and creates backlashes 
towards regulatory avoidance.  
We are of the view that the effectiveness of remuneration regulation will likely lie in 
future successes of malus or clawback enforcements that make examples of 
individuals. As the conditions for malus and clawback are based very much on 
disconnecting reward from firm failure or material non-compliance, the enforcement 
of such regimes may provide the right incentives for individual behavioural change.  
 
Regulating Individuals - Personal Responsibility and Liability 
Financial sector reforms in the UK have also targeted individual conduct in financial 
institutions, recognising that collective culture is shaped by individual incentives72 
and behaviour. The UK has introduced a pioneering regime of individual 
responsibility and liability in financial institutions, targeted especially at senior 
persons.73  
                                                          
69 ‘Wells Fargo Opened a Couple of Million Fake Accounts’, Bloomberg (9 Sep 2016). 
70 Such as in role-based allowances which are structured to be neither fixed nor variable remuneration. 
But the EBA has clamped down in them, see 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/534414/EBA+Report+on+the+principles+on+remunerati
on+policies+and+the+use+of+allowances.pdf. 
71 See Longjie Lu, ‘The End of Bankers Bonus Cap: How Will the UK Regulate Bankers Remuneration 
after Brexit?’ (2016) 27 European Business Law Review 1091. 
72 Jonas Prager, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007/8: Misaligned Incentives, Bank Mismanagement, And 
Troubling Policy Implications’ (2012) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094662, also remuneration 
incentives for individuals that can induce a form of self-interested risk-taking that can collectively pose 
prudential hazards for banks and financial institutions. See Markus K Brunnermeier and others, The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation (Geneva Reports on the World Economy, London: 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 2009); Financial Stability Board, ‘Thematic Review on 
Compensation: Peer Review Report’ (30 March 2010) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf; Bernard S Sharfman, ‘How the 
Strong Negotiating Position of Wall Street Employees Impacts the Corporate Governance of Financial 
Firms’ (2011) 5 Virginia Business and Law Review 350. 
73 ‘Bankers Terrified at New Regulations’, Financial Times (8 March 2016). 
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The PRA and FCA have in place a pre-vetting and approval regime for a range of 
individuals74 and senior persons who wish to be appointed in a financial institution. 
They need to satisfy the regulator of their ‘fitness and propriety’ which relate to 
integrity and competence. 
For senior persons, defined75 as executive directors, non-executive directors who are 
chairmen of Board committees and the key C-suite officers and Heads of Internal 
Control, they need to be approved by the relevant regulator in respect of specific 
areas of responsibility identified according to the regulator’s role map.76 Each senior 
person is approved with a statement of responsibilities which means that the failure 
to carry out such responsibilities will entail specific liability for the relevant senior 
person.77. All senior and certified persons are also subject to an on-going code of 
conduct.78 Senior persons are subject to more obligations under the code of conduct 
than certified individuals, 79 in particular in relation to ensuring effective control over 
their areas of responsibilities and that adequate oversight is instituted. 
The direct regulation of individual responsibilities and behaviour has great potential 
to change individual behaviour as individuals are strongly disincentivised to 
misbehave.80 Senior persons may now be liable for non-compliance within his/her 
area of responsibility where s/he has not taken reasonable steps to prevent such 
breach. 81 Further, personal liability can be incurred for failing to adhere to the 
standards of conduct which include diligence, care, integrity, effective control and 
oversight.  
                                                          
74 PRA Rulebook, Fitness and Propriety and FCA Handbook FIT criteria. 
75 See PRA, Approach to Non-Executive Directors in Banking and Solvency II Firms & Application of 
the Presumption of Responsibility to Senior Managers in Banking Firms (23 Feb 2015). 
76 S59ZA, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as amended by the Financial Services Act 2010. 
77 Section 60(2A), Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as amended by the Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act 2013. 
78 PRA Rulebook, APER Conduct Rules; FCA Handbook, COCON. 
79 PRA/FCA, CP15/22 Strengthening Accountability in Banking: Final rules (including feedback on 
CP14/31 and CP15/5) and consultation on extending the Certification Regime to wholesale market 
activities (July 2015). 
80 Bankers Terrified at New Regulations’, Financial Times (8 March 2016). See empirical research in 
FCA Occasional Paper, Incentivising Compliance with Financial Regulation (Dec 2016). 
81 Sections 66A, 66B, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as amended by the Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act 2013. See also amendment to these sections in the Financial Services Bill 2015 
that will place the onus on the regulator to prove that the senior person has not taken reasonable 
steps to prevent a regulatory contravention in his area of responsibility. 
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Enforcement against individuals by the PRA and FCA has been carried out in a 
number of high profile cases, such as against the former Chief Executive of Mitsui 
Sumitomo for failing to oversee that adequate systems of protection are instituted for 
protection of clients’ money,82 and against a senior business leader Achilles Macris 
at JP Morgan for failing to co-operate with the FCA in an open manner when early 
signs of JP Morgan’s ‘whale loss’83 was being investigated.84 The visibility of 
regulatory enforcement against individuals, and the serious consequence of 
disqualification from working in the financial services industry act as deterrents 
against individual misbehaviour. The UK’s regime for governing individual behaviour 
may be the most pervasive example yet of procedural legalisation aimed at changing 
corporate conduct and culture. .  
In the next Section, we survey how procedural legalisation is taking shape in anti-
bribery regulation that applies to all corporations. It may be argued that financial 
sector regulation is special as prudential soundness and financial stability concerns 
are unique to the sector, hence warranting the adoption of procedural legalisation. 
However, we are of the view that procedural legalisation is not a regulatory design 
confined to the financial sector. Its approach of targeting micro-constituents within 
the corporation to affect their incentives and behaviour, in order to achieve a 
permeating effect throughout the corporate group and beyond, is pertinent to other 
issue areas where changing corporate culture or behaviour is needed. 
(ii) Procedural Legalisation in Anti-Bribery Reform in the UK 
It is the need to target corporate culture and behaviour that renders procedural 
legalisation a particularly useful regulatory tool when seeking to regulate corporate 
bribery.85  By its very nature, bribery is a crime that is shrouded in secrecy86 and 
motivated by personal gain (either directly or as an oblique consequence of the 
relevant corporation’s success).87  As a consequence, bribery is an offence that is 
                                                          
82 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/yohichi-kumagai.pdf. 
83 See ‘JP Morgan makes $920m London Whale payout to regulators’, BBC News (19 Sep 2013). The 
bank lost £6.2bn in risky derivatives trades overseen by a small coterie in the London office, hiding 
the losses from regulators until too late. 
84 FCA Final Notice: Achilles Macris, at https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-
notices/2016/achilles-macris. 
85 The effective regulation of bribery necessitates the control of a range of behavioural and 
organisation features, including those identified by Cressey’s ‘fraud triangle’ of pressure, opportunity 
and rationalisation, each of which is amplified in the corporate setting and exacerbated in a global 
economy.  See: Cressey, Other People’s Money, a Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement 
(Patterson Smith, 1973). 
86 As both the payer and the recipient of the bribe seek to conceal the payment. 
87 Cressey, Other People’s Money, a Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement (Patterson 
Smith, 1973) at 30. 
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not easily governed by orthodox regulatory design, which arguably risks failing to 
address the intrinsic motivation for such corrupt practices.  However, trying to 
prohibit or prevent bribery within transnational corporations is, of course, challenging. 
Organisational hierarchies risk obscuring personal responsibility for compliance,88 
whilst the international reach of the group means that micro-constituents within the 
firm are subject to numerous (and potentially conflicting) regulatory demands and 
social norms.89 As a result, individuals acting on the corporation’s behalf are 
potentially less susceptible not only to extrinsic statutory mandates but also the non-
legal behavioural constraints that may otherwise serve to restrain profitable, yet 
unethical, behaviour.  From a supervisory perspective, these difficulties are 
exacerbated by the often significant separation (both geographically and structurally) 
between the senior management team and other individuals within the corporate 
structure. 
It is against this backdrop that this Section explores how the Bribery Act 2010 sought, 
with early success, to adopt a form of procedural legalisation to manage corporate 
bribery risk.  As shall be seen, the procedural legalisation regime adopted by the 
Bribery Act 2010 is less prescriptive than that discussed in respect of financial sector 
firms as it is predicated, in part, on non-binding guidance issued by the Ministry of 
Justice (the ‘MOJ Guidance’).90  Nevertheless, notwithstanding the ‘soft’ nature of 
this guidance, the Bribery Act remains an important example of procedural 
legalisation.  In particular, the role of internal policies, procedures and training have 
proven to be persuasive both to a determination of a breach of the Act and, in terms 
of reparation, to the court’s willingness to sanction a deferred prosecution agreement 
(‘DPA’).91  
Structure of the Bribery Act 2010 and Ministry of Justice Guidance 
                                                          
88 For example, within a hierarchical organisation, individuals can become task-focused, effectively 
‘out-sourcing’ responsibility for wider decision-making to more senior members of staff.   That is, an 
individual understands their obligation simply to achieve the objectives of the task given to them, even 
where this ‘does not respond to the motives of the individual actor,’ see: Stanley Milgram, Obedience 
to Authority: An Experimental View, (first published Tavistock Publications 1974, rev edn, Pinter & 
Martin 2010) 
89 Social norms being those of a group or community.  That is an ‘effective consensus obligation,’ see: 
Robert Cooter, ‘Expressive Law and Economics,’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 585, 587. 
90 The Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act 2010: Guidance About Procedures which Relevant Commercial 
Organisations can put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with them from Bribing (section 9 of 
the Bribery Act 2010) (March 2011). 
91 See for example the Rolls-Royce Plc DPA (paras 6(v) and 25 – 34) and corresponding Statement 
of Facts (see, for example, paras 16-29) < https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/rolls-royce-plc/> accessed 3 
February 2017. 
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The Bribery Act 2010 introduced a novel approach to corporate offending, which is 
now being replicated in other fields of corporate misconduct.92  It sets out a corporate 
offence of failing to prevent bribery,93 subject only to the defence that a commercial 
organisation had in place adequate procedures94 designed to prevent the bribery 
from occurring.95  The scope of the offence is broad and has expansive extra-
territorial application.96 In this way, the Act effectively governs not only the global 
corporation but also its business network, including suppliers and other third parties 
acting on its behalf. Indeed, it is the scope of the Act that resulted in significant 
global attention and its initial success in achieving changes to many corporations’ 
internal control systems.  
The Act does not specify what constitutes adequate procedures, leaving this as a 
matter for each company to determine.97  The rationale for this approach, and the 
flexibility that it provides, is clear.  Nevertheless, and not surprisingly, the uncertainty 
inherent within the defence was met with widespread industry criticism.98  In 
response to this industry pressure, the Act mandated that the Secretary of State 
publish (non-binding) guidance as to the procedures that commercial organisations 
can put in place pursuant to section 7.99  This MOJ Guidance provides a framework, 
as a matter of soft law, of the minimum standards that a corporation can (and 
arguably should) adopt in efforts to comply with the Act.   As discussed later in this 
Section, the MOJ Guidance clearly highlights the perspective that micro-constituents 
                                                          
92 See for example n (4). 
93 Section 7(1), Bribery Act 2010. 
94 Section 7(2), Bribery Act 2010. 
95 For a more detailed discussion of section 7 see: Anna P. Donovan, ‘Systems and Controls in Anti-
Bribery and Corruption’, in (Iris Hse-Yu Chiu and Michael McKee, eds), The Law on Corporate 
Governance in Banks (Edward Elgar, 2015), 236. 
96 Section 12, Bribery Act 2010 
97 This potential uncertainty is a hallmark of the ‘new governance’ approach in regulation theory, the 
(arguably unavoidable) weaknesses of which are now well acknowledged.  On which, see Section D. 
98 The lack of definition is interesting, given the Law Commission's acknowledgement when 
discussing the term ‘corruptly’ that for ‘a term which is not statutorily defined to be included in the 
definition of an offence, we must be confident that its generally understood meaning is unequivocal 
and that the common meaning is the meaning we would like imported into the offence’ Law 
Commission, `Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (LC 248, 3 March 1998) ('Legislating the 
Criminal Code'), para 5.65.   It remains to be seen whether (although it is unlikely) a commercial 
organisation will attempt a defence premised on the incompatibility of the adequate procedures 
defence with the European Convention requiring certainty of law.  However, maintaining a claim that 
the law is too uncertain to be enforceable is a difficult task, see: Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 
397, [1993] ECHR 14307/88 and Handyside v United Kingdom (application 5493/72) (1976) 1 EHRR 
737, [1976] ECHR 5493/72. 
99 Section 9(1), Bribery Act 2010. 
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within the corporation have potentially significant governance capacities and 
responsibilities.  
The MOJ Guidance sets out six flexible and procedural but ‘outcome focused’100 
principles that commercial organisations should implement.101 These principles are 
premised on a balance between prescription and flexibility, encouraging firms to 
develop bespoke solutions to bribery risks without facilitating creative102 or merely 
symbolic103 compliance.  The MOJ Guidance expects firms to implement holistic 
managerial and organisational changes to meet the Act’s defence of adequate 
procedures.  In doing so, procedural legalisation is used to influence organisations’ 
internal controls and senior management responsibility.  We note that even though 
the guidance is not binding, it is likely to comprise the minimum requirements for a 
robust defence and, as outlined above, is persuasive when looking at the small 
number of cases that have been prosecuted under the Act.104 
Regulating culture and internal responsibilities 
At a fundamental level, anti-corruption regulation needs to address the difficult 
question of corporate culture. Bribery often occurs when individual incentives, the 
firm’s internal control functions (or lack thereof) and the firm’s culture coalesce to 
form a normative environment that either facilitates or fails to adequately deter 
bribery.105 Where individuals consider paying a bribe, they may be restrained by 
informal sanctions by peers (reflected in the norms of the corporation’s culture, which 
acts as a powerful form of social ordering)106 or by formal sanctions from their 
employer (as detected by internal controls and enforced by the firm). Where they are 
                                                          
100 MOJ Guidance, 20. 
101 These six principles are: (i) proportionate procedures; (ii) top-level commitment; (iii) risk 
assessment; (iv) due diligence; (v) communication (including training); and (vi) monitoring and review. 
102 As to the relationship between creative compliance and command and control style legislation see: 
Doreen McBarnet, ‘Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the 
Banking Crisis,’ in Iain MacNeil and Justin O’Brien (eds.) The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart 
Publishing 2010), 79. 
103 See: Edelman (n 24). 
104 See (n 91).  See also the Standard Bank Plc DPA (paras 6 (vi), and 27 - 32) and Statement of 
Facts (especially part F, part I, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3) <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/11/30/sfo-
agrees-first-uk-dpa-with-standard-bank/> accessed 4 February 2017. 
105 For the power of social (group) norms on individual decision making see: Michael Wenzel, ‘The 
Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of Deterrence,’ (2004) 28(5) Law 
and Human Behavior 547; Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96(4) Columbia 
Law Review 903. 
106 Benjamin E. Hermalin, Economics & Corporate Culture (2000) University of California, 2 available 
here < http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/cultchds.pdf> (accessed 8 February 2016). 
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not so deterred, either by a permissive corporate culture, a weak environment of 
internal control or both, then there is, effectively, no basis to constrain self-interested 
behaviour.107  Thus, the importance of culture should not be understated.  The 
relatively low risk of individual prosecution means that it is these non-legal behavioral 
constraints that are instrumental to achieving meaningful individual behavioral 
change.  
In seeking to mobilise these social constraints, the MOJ Guidance places collective 
responsibility on the Board to instil a ‘zero-tolerance’ culture to bribery.108  The 
Guidance is, unsurprisingly, unequivocal that the obligation to eradicate bribery 
should supersede other (financial) incentives that may exist within the firm.109  In this 
way, it seeks to act as a normative ordering function,110 attempting to reinstate (or, 
indeed, potentially introduce) the primacy of ethical decision making over the 
financial pressures that may otherwise contribute to corrupt behaviour.  A critical 
factor in achieving this objective is to interrupt the unintended consequences of the 
internal decision-making hierarchies that are essential to corporate life but can serve 
to insulate individuals from legal and moral responsibilities.111  To do so, the MOJ 
Guidance looks to influence organisational roles and responsibilities (at both board 
and senior management levels) in two key ways.      
First, the Guidance prescribes that the obligation to achieve a cultural shift (where 
necessary) within the firm falls firmly within the Board’s remit. Whilst the board may 
not have day-to-day responsibility for ensuring compliance with the corporation’s 
anti-bribery and corruption policies, it remains ultimately responsible (and 
accountable) for ensuring that the Act’s objectives are met.  This is reflected in the 
recent Rolls-Royce Plc DPA, which was clear that ultimate responsibility for 
‘identifying, assessing and addressing risks’ remains with the board.112 More 
specifically, the Guidance recommends that the Board should be involved in any key 
decisions concerning the management of bribery risk and is tasked with adequately 
communicating the firm’s culture to both its employees and the third parties that it 
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engages with (discussed further below).  As part of this responsibility, the Board is 
expected to make formal statements (both internally and to its external partners) 
stipulating the firm’s anti-bribery stance and its commitment to engage in fair and 
honest business.  
Secondly, to address the immediate challenge that a potentially nebulous 
requirement for cultural change may face, the MOJ Guidance encourages the 
imposition of individual responsibilities supported by organisational reporting lines 
and structures.  In particular, it requires that there are individuals within the senior 
management team that have clear responsibility for the design, implementation and 
monitoring of anti-bribery procedures.  Moreover, these individuals must have 
suitable access, and direct reporting lines, to the Board to enable them to discharge 
these functions and raise any compliance concerns with the board directly.  They 
must be adequately positioned within the firm (to achieve the difficult balance of 
independence whilst being apprised of the risks that the business faces) and 
sufficiently resourced to mitigate bribery within a large organisation.113  This 
delegation of day-to-day responsibility further distils another important function of the 
Board’s responsibility (as stated by the MOJ Guidance).  That is, the compliance 
team must be visibly supported by the Board to enable them to discharge their duties.  
In particular, they must be seen by other individuals within the organisation to 
possess the authority and backing of the Board to enable them to, in effect, 
counteract the commercial pressures that may give rise to resistance to some of the 
decisions that the compliance team may make (such as the refusal to sanction 
certain lucrative, but high risk, contracts).    
Regulating Internal Systems and Controls 
Operationally, the ability to commit a bribery offence coincides with perceptions of a 
relatively low risk of detection after the bribe has been paid.  An organisation that 
has poor accounting procedures, inadequate oversight and review functions, 
ineffective internal audit and no procedures for proper due diligence provides its 
employees with extensive opportunities to engage in corrupt practices with relative 
impunity. Inadequacies in firms’ internal systems are therefore instrumental in 
creating an ineffective control environment. Whilst most firms have always adopted 
some system of internal control, these are understandably focussed on the 
objectives of the firm, not necessarily the wider public concerns that the Act seeks to 
address.114  In addition, these controls risk being merely ‘cosmetic,’115 stipulating a 
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seemingly robust policy on paper but failing to be adequately implemented and 
enforced.116  Thus, procedural legalisation is employed by the Act and MOJ 
Guidance to distinctly target internal control functions and senior management in 
order to empower them to address firm weaknesses that are susceptible to allowing 
bribery to occur.   The MOJ Guidance is clear that these procedures should be 
proportionate to the risks faced by the business and therefore must reflect the 
findings of a bespoke risk-assessment undertaken to determine the actual risks 
faced by the organisation.117   
Giving the need to tailor internal processes to a particular corporate environment, 
neither the Act nor the MOJ Guidance prescribe what procedures or policies a firm 
must adopt (although the MOJ Guidance provides a non-exhaustive list of policies 
that a firm should consider).118  Ultimately, the internal control functions of the 
corporation are responsible for the bespoke design and implementation of such 
policies, predicated on a robust and regular risk assessment.  However, as a 
minimum, these procedures will likely include policies that set out the firm’s 
overarching commitment to bribery prevention together with specific policies to 
prevent or detect bribery. Common controls and policies include those concerning 
gifts and hospitality, financial reporting and controls, facilitation payments and 
whistle-blowing.  A particularly acute risk facing international organisations is the 
engagement of third parties, which is discussed further in the next section.   
Recognising the role of micro-constituents in combatting bribery risk, the MOJ 
Guidance recommends that these procedural changes should be supported by 
communication and training, which is to be rolled out throughout all levels of the 
organisation.119  To improve compliance culture, it is imperative that communication 
can be made openly and easily throughout the corporation.  That is, both to the 
senior management and by the senior management.  The board needs to convey a 
culture of zero-tolerance to bribery whilst reassuring staff that compliance with this 
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culture, even against the seeming self-interest of the firm, will be rewarded.  A key 
part of this will be publishing enforcement decisions in respect of any breach of 
policy.  Further, those on the ‘front line’ of the business need to inform management 
of the risks that they encounter together with any difficulties that they experience 
when implementing internal policies in practice.  One important aspect of this 
communication exercise is the periodic and bespoke training of staff.  The Guidance 
is clear that training must be tailored to each aspect of the workforce including in 
some instances to third parties.  
Procedural Legalisation Affecting Third Parties 
Transnational corporations face significant exposure under the Act in respect of the 
conduct of third parties acting on their behalf, conduct that is specifically caught by 
the broad remit of section 7.  The corporate offence extends not only to corporate 
employees or (potentially) subsidiaries but also to other ‘associated persons’120 that 
bribe with the intent of, inter alia, retaining business or obtaining an advantage in the 
course of business for the corporation.121  Moreover, the broad extra-territorial reach 
of the offence further increases the potential liability that a corporation has for third 
parties and, as a consequence, the necessary scope of internal procedures that are 
adopted by an organisation to satisfy the Act’s defence.  Managing this third party 
risk is not easy.  As explained earlier, the geographical structure of the transnational 
firm means that not only is effective control of such third parties challenging, but also 
that some parties may be operating in an environment where bribery (or certain 
forms of it) are viewed as commonplace or normatively acceptable.  However, the 
clear risk that an external partner will commit bribery on the firm’s behalf means that 
to meaningfully address corporate corruption, it was necessary for the Act to be 
structured in this way.122   
The MOJ Guidance encourages organisations to introduce robust due diligence 
procedures that should be followed before engaging third parties.123  The range of 
third parties that could be caught includes those within the corporation’s supply chain, 
lobbyists, introducers and local contractors.  This due diligence should be 
undertaken on a risk-based approach, having regard to the nature of the third party 
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relationship, the identity of the third party, their territory of operation and the industry 
that they operate in. These controls extend to both internal procedures for engaging 
the third party and monitoring payments to them, together with the investigation of, 
and interview with, the third party itself.   
The consequence of this requirement is that procedural legalisation is used to 
change behaviour within and beyond the corporation through the interaction of 
micro-constituents that are now governed by certain mandatory procedural 
structures. Further, a corporation may also manage the bribery risk in relation to its 
third party agents by contracting for rights to see books and records, and including 
warranties in any contracts that they enter into on the corporation’s behalf. Third 
party agents may also have to be subject to periodic training.   A considerable part of 
the success of the Act is attributable to the fact that it, effectively, extends its 
procedural requirements to a significant range of corporate actors.124  
In sum, procedural legalisation as applied in anti-bribery regulation targets senior 
management and internal control, achieving some extent of prescription but not as 
extensively as under financial sector regulation. The flexibility that the soft guidance 
provided by the MOJ gives to corporations in implementing internal controls, and to 
the courts in deciding whether these are adequate, is to be welcomed.  However, the 
effectiveness of this hybrid approach between a regulatory requirement for ‘adequate 
procedures’ and soft guidance as to what this might entail does depend upon the 
robust enforcement of the Act.  Whilst the UK Serious Fraud Office has been steadily 
enforcing against companies, and implicated senior management, this action needs 
to continue for the Act to retain its position as an international gold-standard in anti-
corruption initiatives and for the effectiveness of the non-binding MOJ Guidance to 
continue.125  
Procedural legalisation can create incentives that cascade though the corporate 
group and to inter-relations with the corporation. It is hoped that corporate culture 
can be gradually shaped and changed and this could achieve a regulatory 
breakthrough particularly in fields that are unresponsive to command and control 
regulation or prone to creative compliance.  Procedural legalisation in the rather 
mature and precise form as applied to the financial sector, or in a softer form as 
applied to regulation against bribery, has the potential to be used more widely in 
corporate regulation, particularly for complex and stubborn issues where progress in 
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changing corporate behaviour and culture has hitherto been limited using other 
regulatory techniques.  
In the next Section, we argue that procedural legalisation indeed challenges 
established corporate law theories that have been instrumental in creating barriers to 
effective corporate regulation. Procedural legalisation reaches deep into 
corporations’ systems, processes and responsible individuals, and ‘regulating 
beneath the corporate veil’ can be challenged by both the ‘real entity’ and ‘nexus of 
contracts’ theory of the corporation, even if both theories are not prima facie 
reconcilable. However, Section D argues that regulating beneath the veil is anchored 
in modern regulation theory which is able to expose the limitations in the theoretical 
conceptions of the corporation. It is a de-constructivist approach that can finally 
achieve a breakthrough in corporate regulation hampered by prevailing corporate 
law theories.  
C. Relationship of Procedural Legalisation to Corporate Law 
It is trite law that a company is, upon registration, a separate person from its 
members.126  This remains true even in a group situation, where individual entities 
within the group retain their separate personality notwithstanding commonality of 
ownership.127 By introducing regulation within the corporate structure, it can be 
argued that procedural legalisation is incompatible with theoretical conceptions of 
corporate personhood. However, the theoretical premises are limited and corporate 
law has over the years introduced mandatory regulation that intervenes into the 
internal order within the corporation.  
The ‘real entity’ theory of the corporation seeks to characterise the nature of the 
corporation not simply as a legal abstract but as a social, living, organism.  Multiple 
individuals associating with each other to form a corporate entity create a separate 
and independent personality.128  For advocates of this school of thought,129 the 
function of law is to recognise this personality,130 which ‘enjoys any rights and duties 
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that [it] could exercise.’131 In this way, the real entity theory supports the protection of 
separate personality and its consequences including the protection of limited 
liability.132   
In contrast, the dominant Anglo-American theory as to the origin of the firm is 
contractarianism.133  For contractarians, the company is essentially a ‘nexus of 
contracts,’134 an efficient means of organising multiple ‘factors of production.’135 A 
company exists to centralise the organisation’s operations, avoiding the transaction 
costs of individually negotiating on the open market to secure the necessary inputs 
(such as labour and raw materials) required to achieve the firm’s objectives.  The 
theory establishes the ‘quintessentially private and self-ordered nature of a 
company’s management affairs,’136 which should be mainly free from state 
intervention. For contractarians, most governmental interference with the private 
conduct of the organisation is illegitimate as company law should only embody the 
default terms that the parties to the nexus would have agreed, i.e. their optimal 
‘hypothetical bargains’.137 
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Albeit by different theoretical pathways, corporate law theories would seem unable to 
support what procedural legalisation seeks to achieve. Under the real entity theory, 
introducing procedural legalisation could be perceived to be an illegitimate intrusion 
into the internal order of the corporate personality, violating the personhood of the 
real entity. Under the nexus of contracts theory, procedural legalisation is anomalous 
as it intrudes upon the contractual freedoms of the constituents in the ‘nexus’ and 
would arguably create distortions in their bargaining order.  
Both theoretical premises are however incomplete. The real entity theory is not a 
unified living organism like natural legal persons. Indeed, the corporation acts via the 
decision-making of its organs, the Board and its shareholders in general meeting, 
such as in making a decision to sue,138 and in removing directors via a shareholders’ 
ordinary resolution at general meeting.139 Corporate law has also introduced 
mandatory legislation that looks into the internal order within the corporation to 
determine the corporation’s responsibility. For example, the Corporate Homicide and 
Manslaughter Act 2007, which attributes gross negligence in internal management 
and control to the corporation so as to make the corporation liable for homicide. The 
nexus of contracts theory places too much emphasis on the freedom of ‘contracting’ 
constituents beneath the veil to achieve a negotiated state of order, while ignoring 
both the realities of imperfect contracting due to imbalances of power or information 
among constituents, and the possible externalities that can be caused by private 
collective action.140 Mandatory company law does not reflect the strict premises of 
this theory and has indeed intervened in the freedom of exercise of power, for 
example, on the part of majority shareholders to secure the overall good of the 
company in constitutional amendments.141  
The theoretical accounts of corporate personhood are incomplete and present no 
real objections to mandatory regulation within the corporate structure. Petrin142 also 
argues that corporate theory is often mis-used to serve certain insular interests.143 
Procedural legalisation is not incompatible with corporate law. However, as 
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procedural legalisation introduces a new expanse of mandatory regulation within the 
corporate structure, we argue that there is a need to account for its legitimacy. In the 
next Section, we provide such an account based on ‘new governance’ approaches in 
regulation theory.   
 
D. Foundation for Procedural Legalisation as a Form of Corporate Regulation - 
Perspectives from Regulation Theory 
Procedural legalisation may be regarded as having its roots in an area of regulation 
theory known as ‘new governance’. ‘New governance’ is a broad term that covers 
various regulatory innovations focused on decentralised, participatory, problem-
solving approaches to regulation, as opposed to traditional regulation's focus on 
centralised dictation of rules developed by experts with state-imposed penalties for 
non-compliance.144 It is increasingly acknowledged in political science literature that 
modern platforms of authority for problem solving come from a variety of state-based 
and non-state-based sources.145 The governance of an issue area therefore departs 
from traditional command-and-control regulation, which places emphasis on the 
state being able to prescribe obligations and to secure the regulated entities’ 
compliance by enforcement. It is increasingly recognised that states may not be 
optimally placed to prescribe and control in areas where non-state actors interact 
with regulated entities and co-exert forms of authority. The governance of 
transnational corporate behaviour may be regarded as situated in a ‘decentred’146 
regulatory space.147  
Black argues that decentred regulation is premised on five preconditions, namely 
complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, ungovernability and the rejection of a 
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clear private-public distinction.148 ‘Complexity’ refers to the nature of problems that 
need to be solved. ‘Fragmentation’ refers to the diffusion of knowledge, resources 
and capacity for control in the regulatory space. ‘Interdependencies’ refers to the 
dynamics between participants in the regulatory space, co-producing and co-
enforcing norms of governance. ‘Ungovernability’ refers to the autonomy and 
unpredictability of actor behaviour in the regulatory space, posing challenges to 
assumptions made by regulatory authorities. In a decentred landscape, governance 
is ‘polycentric’149 as all relevant actors, public or private, contribute to and influence 
governance in a landscape of distributed power among many actors. In essence, 
state-based authorities jostle for governance power with international organisations, 
business and industry, industry associations, think-tanks and other private sector for-
profit and not-for-profit organisations.150  Hence, modern governance initiatives often 
feature a mixture of state-based frameworks, private sector implementation, and 
third party or market monitoring.  
In this context, regulation can be regarded as an exercise that leverages upon 
different governance capacities, not necessarily in a co-ordinated manner. In the 
area of transnational corporate behaviour, the power, capacity and resources of 
transnational corporations could dwarf some states, and give rise to issues that may 
be difficult to regulate using traditional regulatory techniques. Hence, the governance 
of transnational corporate behaviour needs to leverage upon corporations 
themselves in forms of coordination and collaboration with the governance actorhood 
of states, stakeholders, international organisations and so on.151 
One of the ‘new governance’ approaches to regulation, meta-regulation,152 focuses 
very much on the regulated firms themselves being able to contribute to aspects of 
self-governance. Meta-regulation refers to a regulatory approach that empowers and 
enhances the capacity of corporations to self-regulate, but connects ‘the private 
justice of the internal management system’ to the ‘public justice of accountability’.153 
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Parker proposes that firms’ capacity to self-regulate may be enhanced by value 
orientation, management commitment, the acquisition of skills and knowledge, and 
the design of internal processes and systems. Such ‘self-regulation’ should then be 
accountable to regulators and stakeholders in order to achieve not just ‘compliance’ 
but responsibility towards society more broadly. Parker envisages that ‘meta-
regulation’ would improve the permeability of the corporation to public 
accountability.154 
Meta-regulation can thus be seen as a form of non-intrusive or ‘reflexive’ law that 
restrains over-prescription and over-intrusion by command-and-control regulation in 
favour of less ‘formalistic’ and more responsive approaches that reflect changes in 
social order.155 Hence, early approaches in meta-regulation are very much based on 
skeletal regulatory frameworks that deal with corporate organisation or processes 
that firms are free to adapt. Firms develop their own systems and control, not by 
standardised prescription, to meet the overall objectives of public accountability. An 
example is management-based regulation discussed by Coglianese and Lazer,156 
describing how regulation could provide frameworks for the planning, management 
or implementation of certain strategies for compliance by firms, in order to secure 
certain substantive objectives. These frameworks are not highly prescriptive and 
firms can implement appropriate systems or processes tailored to their needs while 
effectively achieving regulatory expectations.157  
However, meta-regulation suffers from certain weaknesses. The reflexive nature of 
meta-regulation means that regulatory frameworks are often broadly-based. But 
firms may pervert the discretion given to them, by implementing procedures that 
seem to comply but are only superficial and box-ticking in nature. Further, firms can 
even design systems and procedures that appear compliant while gaming the 
regulatory regime, such incentives are likely to be kept under control only if 
regulators are vigilant and critical in their supervision.158 The Basel II Capital Accord 
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is an example in financial sector regulation that highlights the weaknesses of meta-
regulation. 159  
The micro-prudential regulation framework developed for the most sophisticated 
banks and financial institutions in 2006 is a form of meta-regulation.160 Micro-
prudential regulation for banks first developed in 1988 based on a set of prescriptive 
standards for banks to adopt in determining the riskiness of their assets, so that they 
could ensure adequate capital is set aside for their assets.161 The Basel II Capital 
Accord162 moved away from the prescriptive standards as they were one-size-fits-all 
and too crude in measuring risk profiles. Hence, the Accord allowed banks with more 
sophisticated internal risk management systems to use their internal models and 
systems to determine certain aspects of riskiness of their assets.163 This to an extent 
allowed banks to determine their capital adequacy compliance. Although it has been 
intended that regulatory scrutiny should be exercised over firm implementation, so 
that regulators are operating at a meta-level of supervision, regulators have found it 
hard to make judgments on the technical robustness of banks’ internal models.  
Hence, the meta-regulatory approach in micro-prudential regulation has actually 
become a form of self-regulation in banks. This is a chief weakness of meta-
regulation.164 In reality, as commentators have pointed out, banks that were in a 
position to determine their own capital charges have tended to set aside less capital 
                                                          
159 See chapter 12, Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Financial 
Regulation (Oxford: Routledge 2014). 
160 Also discussed in Robert F Weber, ‘New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to 
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation’ (2010) 62 
Administrative Law Review 783. 
161 This is the standardised ‘risk-weighting’ approach, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988) at 
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Requirements Directive). 
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International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework -- 
Comprehensive Version (June 2006) at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm. 
164 Larisa Dragomir, European Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision (Oxford: Routledge 
2010) at 124ff. 
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and taken on more risk,165 putting their profit objectives above the regulatory 
objective of soundness and prudence. The backlash against the near-self-regulatory 
approach in Basel II has resulted in the return of more prescriptive standards for 
capital adequacy in the Basel III Capital Accord introduced in the wake of the global 
financial crisis.166 However as the Basel III Accord cannot revert to simplistic 
assumptions of riskiness such as under the Basel I Accord, the discretionary 
approaches by banks discussed above are not superseded. Nevertheless, banks 
using them are subject to international surveys of their implementation differences 
and to greater supervision by regulators.167 
The global financial crisis 2007-9 has indeed brought about more reflective thinking 
in relation to the achievements and weaknesses of meta-regulation. Ford168 
articulates that the chief weakness of meta-regulation lies in it being susceptible to 
firm abuse. Meta-regulation may be criticised as ‘trusting’ too much in the 
corporation, and regulators have not been sufficiently engaged to ensure that firm 
implementation is consistent with regulatory objectives. The fallibility of ‘trust’ in the 
corporation lies in the failure to understand the motivations and processes related to 
firm implementation, which is undertaken by micro-constituents in the corporation. 
                                                          
165Michael McAleer, Juan-Angel Jiménez-Martin and Teodosio Pérez- Amaral, “What Happened to 
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consistency of implementation, Basel Committee, Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme (Oct 2013) at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs264.htm; Basel Committee, Reducing 
Excessive Variability in Banks’ Regulatory Capital Ratios: A Report to the G20 (Nov 2014) at para 2. 
Such work is also undertaken by the European Banking Authority which desires to reduce 
inconsistencies in banks’ IRB implementation and hence check any potential abuse of their discretion 
in using these approaches, see for example EBA, Fourth Report on the Consistency of Risk Weighted 
Assets (11 June 2014) at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15947/20140611+Fourth+interim+report+on+the+consist
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168 Cristie Ford, ‘New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Review, see 
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Without such understanding, any ‘trust’ in corporations to implement their self-
governance is misplaced and naïve.  
Procedural legalisation now takes us one step towards reconstructing such trust on a 
sounder footing, and re-introduces regulatory governance over micro-constituents 
that shape corporate behaviour. Regulators, particularly within the financial services 
sector, are able to have more meaningful engagement in supervising firm 
implementation, as they are able to look for more precise pockets of responsibility 
within the firm, target supervisory dialogue with the relevant micro-constituents and 
construct more specific criteria for evaluating firm implementation.   
That said, as we have seen in Section B, this engagement is not as prevalent within 
the anti-bribery sphere.  Whilst the relative independence afforded to corporations by 
the Bribery Act 2010 reflects a deliberate effort to enable proportionate and bespoke 
procedures to be adopted, this does come at the risk of uncertainty and a lack of 
enforcement (in all but the largest transgressions).  This potential shortcoming of the 
regime has not been remedied by the recent sanction of DPAs under the Act.  Whilst 
these DPAs give insight into those internal control frameworks that have proven to 
be insufficient, these clearly egregious examples provide little guidance to those 
organisations that are not similarly positioned.  Moreover, the DPAs leave the detail 
of the revised internal controls that are to be implemented in reparation as a matter 
for the corporation and its appointed monitor.  As a consequence, this lack of 
disclosure again limits the amount of guidance that the DPA can offer to other 
organisations looking for insight into how the Act might be complied with and 
enforced.  Against this, we do not suggest that the anti-bribery regime should (at this 
stage) adopt a procedural legalisation regime that is as prescriptive as that engaged 
by financial services regulation.  However, without more active enforcement of the 
Act some movement towards binding guidance may need to be contemplated.  As a 
minimum, consideration should be made to putting the current soft law requirement 
of a periodic risk assessment on a mandatory footing (whilst retaining, as a matter of 
soft law, guidance on how to respond to any identified risks).  This mandatory 
reporting requirement will potentially enhance individual responsibility (as the board 
cannot deny knowledge of the risks identified in the report), contributing both to the 
implementation of effective internal controls or, if necessary, enforcement efforts by 
the regulator.    
The social and regulatory appetite for exerting more governance and control over 
financial services has accelerated after 2007 and culminated in expansive,169 
prescriptive170 and paternalistic171 regulation in the financial sector. This impetus has 
                                                          
169J De Larosière and others, Report by the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU 
(Brussels, 25 February 2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf. 
170 For example The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation 2014 has become 
prescriptive with regard to trade reporting and financial intermediary conduct; The European Markets 
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paved the way for addressing and reforming the inadequacies of meta-regulation 
approaches that have become too permissive. Procedural legalisation can be seen 
as an improvement upon the weaknesses of meta-regulation. 
Nevertheless, it is not immediately obvious that procedural legalisation is an 
extension or refinement of meta-regulation. This is because it seems to depart from 
the de-centred tenet in new governance approaches by re-asserting state-based 
authority in demanding regulatory compliance. The prescriptive nature of procedural 
legalisation seems removed from being collaborative with firm-specific needs and 
indeed introduces compliance cost. It would appear that procedural legalisation 
(within the financial services sector at least) intends to dis-empower corporations 
from exercising implementation discretion. It can be argued that procedural 
legalisation boosts the position of regulators vis a vis regulated firms, and places 
regulators in a position where command-and-control techniques could be well-placed 
to resume. In this way, procedural legalisation can be framed in a more antagonistic 
than collaborative manner, departing from the ‘new governance’ tenet.  
However, we argue that procedural legalisation is not only consistent with the ‘new 
governance’ tenet of de-centred participation and problem-solving, but that it 
appropriately refines meta-regulation to address its weaknesses. In doing so, 
procedural legalisation provides a new ‘new governance’ account of corporate 
regulation.  
Although procedural legalisation is far more prescriptive than meta-regulation, we 
argue that its prescriptive nature is the part represented by the state’s participation in 
the de-centred landscape for governing corporations, and to an extent, in offering 
standardisations in optimal structures for corporations based on lessons learnt post-
scandals or crises. Hence, procedural legalisation does not depart from the de-
centred landscape but merely refines the nature of the state’s role in that landscape. 
By introducing regulatory standardisations for structures and processes, the state 
arguably mediates the efficiency values of the internal order of the firm with the 
broader social values of corporate power and responsibility, therefore providing a 
richer account regulatory standardisation beyond transaction-cost reduction.  
Further, it can be argued that inadequate attention has been paid to the different 
incentives and governance capacities of micro-constituents within the corporation, 
and hence they have been insufficiently empowered to participate in the de-centred 
governance landscape. By introducing procedural legalisation, micro-constituents 
within the corporation are given distinct visibility in their governance role, providing a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Infrastructure Regulation 2010 is highly prescriptive as to the types of transactions that have to be 
centrally cleared and prudential requirements for clearing houses and the Capital Requirements 
Directive and Regulation 2014 is highly prescriptive on the prudential regulation applicable to banks. 
171 See discussion on consumer protection regulation in chapter 8, Mads Andenas and Iris H-Y Chiu, 
The Foundations and Anatomy of Financial Regulation (Oxford: Routledge 2014). 
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richer balance in the dynamics of governance. Further, procedural legalisation can 
be regarded as introducing the necessary standards for corporations to regain trust 
for their governance role and capacity in the de-centred landscape. After corporate 
scandals and crises, the credibility of corporations in supplying a governance role for 
themselves is inevitably put into doubt. Moreover, it is neither practicable nor 
balanced to exclude their governance role. In this manner, ‘procedural legalisation’ 
provides a new basis for the actorhood of corporations in the governance landscape, 
and can be regarded as a more refined account of the dynamics in the de-centred 
landscape, consistent with ‘new governance’ approaches.  
Importantly, procedural legalisation is able to place the micro-constituents within the 
corporation onto the same de-centred platform to maximise their governance 
capacity. Procedural legalisation places internal control functions for example in the 
de-centred governance landscape, being empowered to monitor the financial 
institution for compliant behaviour. The due diligence functions in a corporation are 
highlighted in order to champion anti-bribery behaviour. This approach achieves a 
form of corporate regulation through de-constructing the firm’s internal structures and 
functions, giving them a distinct governance identity. This is consistent with the ‘new 
governance’ tenet that reaches out to leverage upon the governance capacity and 
actorhood of a wide range of players in the de-centred landscape. Whether we apply 
the real entity theory or the nexus of contracts theory, we have created a blind spot 
as to the actorhood of micro-constituents within the corporation. The real entity 
theory subsumes micro-constituents such as individuals or departmental groupings 
under the organisational umbrella of the corporation, but it is already well recognised 
by both organisational science and corporate governance theorists that micro-
constituents are not homogenous and indeed very different. micro-constituents 
Although the ‘nexus of contracts’ theory pays regard to micro-constituents beneath 
the corporation, micro-constituents are regarded only as economic agents interested 
in organisational efficiencies and financial wealth-creation in their self-interest. 
Taking this view, the role of regulation vis a vis such micro-constituents can only be 
limited to facilitating their transactions. This is an unduly narrow conception of micro-
constituents, ignoring their attributes, capacities and interests, and the wider 
consequences of their collective action. Hence, ‘procedural legalisation’ can de-
construct the unduly narrow and insular conception of the nature of micro-
constituents assumed by the ‘nexus of contracts’ theory, and allow us to fully 
consider their actorhood and responsibilities in the de-centred governance space for 
transnational corporations. Reaching into the tenets of the ‘new governance’ 
approach in modern regulation theory, procedural legalisation can be firmly anchored 
and represent a new milestone in corporate regulation. 
Nevertheless, reaching into ‘new governance’ to provide a theoretically supportable 
account of procedural legalisation does not mean carte blanche for regulators to 
introduce micro-management of corporations. Regulatory design must be based on 
identifying the extent of actorhood and capacity on the part of micro-constituents, so 
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that the governance of their behaviour can be articulated precisely and in proportion 
to their governance capacity. In the next Section, we argue that procedural 
legalisation can be further developed in two respects in order to be effective. First, 
insights from organisational behaviour are necessary to highlight possible 
achievements and limitations of regulation targeted at micro constituent behaviour.  
Secondly, there is a need to ensure that an adequately designed enforcement 
regime flanks the objectives intended to be achieved in procedural legalisation.  
E.  The Need for Further Development of Procedural Legalisation 
The key achievement of procedural legalisation is the mobilisation of micro-
constituents’ governance capacity within the corporation. However, as the goal in 
mobilising micro-constituents’ behaviour lies in changing corporate behaviour and 
culture, the links need to be established between micro-constituents’ behaviour and 
corporate decision-making, culture and behaviour. Hence, we need to understand 
insights from organisational science172  and behavioural research173 in order to 
ascertain how changes in micro constituent behaviour could have ramifications 
through the organisational fabric. Studies on the organisational attributes, features 
and factors that drive or prevent ethical decision-making and embedment in 
corporate culture do not provide an exact scientific method as to how regulation can 
be designed.174 We advocate that interdisciplinary insights should not be used simply 
and in a formulaic manner, but regulators should be clearly aware that they are 
wading into the area of law and behaviour and should use these insights judiciously 
in regulatory design.   
Parker and Nielsen175 argue that procedure-based regulation can change firm culture, 
by promoting the values of oversight, accountability, respect for processes, intra-firm 
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coordination and intra-firm education. Killingsworth176 opines that procedural clarity 
has an important part to play in embedding corporate culture. Procedural clarity, 
coupled with fair implementation, encourages all within the organisation to subscribe 
to the substantive values underlying the procedures. Hence, procedural legalisation 
in financial sector regulation can contribute towards the building up of a financially 
prudent culture, and could contribute to a zero tolerance culture towards bribery in 
the anti-bribery situation. Consistent organisational implementation is crucial to 
changing corporate culture.177 Moreover, reinforcement from senior management178 
is important to support the enduring quality of such changes.  
However, in comparing the scope and extent of procedural legalisation in financial 
regulation to that in anti-bribery regulation, the former can be regarded as much 
more developed with its multi-pronged approach in targeting corporate governance, 
internal control functions, other organisational institutions such as whistleblowing, 
and individual incentives and personal responsibility. These together constitute a 
multi-pronged model which can form a blueprint for procedural legalisation in other 
areas of corporate sector regulation. In this manner, anti-bribery regulation may be 
evolving towards this mature blueprint, and it may take a major corporate scandal to 
make the tipping point. 
The growing popularity and importance of procedural legalisation as a regulatory 
means to change corporate behaviour is also witnessed in recent regulatory 
developments in relation to ‘due diligence’ frameworks for corporations in the areas 
of modern slavery,179 business and human rights180 and corporations’ environmental 
and social footprint,181 although such frameworks are less developed than under 
anti-bribery regulation. Our study may therefore shed some light in the incremental 
developments in procedural legalisation: meta-regulatory frameworks may give way 
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to soft law that more precisely delineate organisational structures and expectations 
for corporate culture (such as in anti-bribery regulation) and ultimately to legalised 
structures and frameworks if the regulatory objective is perceived not to be met. 
Hence, if corporate behaviour is not significantly improved or if a major corporate 
scandal breaks out, the developing nature of meta-regulatory frameworks may 
crystallise into more mature procedural legalisation such as under financial 
regulation. 
It may be argued that procedural legalisation only reflects regulators’ anxiety to 
impose more control in the wake of a corporate scandal or crisis, as is the case with 
financial regulation which responded to social appetite for reform after the global 
financial crisis. However, we are of the view that resort to procedural legalisation is 
not merely a knee-jerk policy response. Procedural legalisation in financial regulation 
is based on and consistent with a range of empirical research into organisational and 
governance flaws.182 Procedural legalisation reflects the integration of policy with 
regulation theory, corporate governance and organisational behaviour and is 
arguably multi-disciplinary and informed. 
Nevertheless, critical insights from organisational behaviour would remain crucial to 
appraising the effectiveness of procedural legalisation as we continue to observe 
how corporate and individual behaviour change with time.  
Obstacles in Organisational Structures 
Gunningham et al183 point out that procedure-based regulation that targets certain 
groupings in an organisation may have limited impact on changing corporate culture 
and behaviour if the leadership from such groupings is unable to percolate all levels. 
Organisational dynamics may in some cases facilitate procedural legalisation and in 
some cases obstruct its effective outworking. Regulators need to be mindful of 
entrenched organisational structures such as silos.  
Behavioural Biases 
Further, regulators may also wish to draw upon insights from behavioural theories in 
order to address unintended consequences of regulatory impact on micro constituent 
behaviour. Behavioural theories have become important as the assumption of 
rationality in human behaviour, decision-making and choice is greatly misplaced.184 
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For example, as internal control functions have always been framed as serving the 
firm’s purposes, framing their functions towards changing the corporate culture and 
securing regulatory objectives may run counter to their anchor heuristic. The anchor 
heuristic describes people as likely to stick to their first choices, decisions or 
understandings, as these have been internalised and accepted earlier. So, would 
internal control functions feel pressured by their new regulatory obligations and 
responsibilities, and struggle in divided loyalty - serving the firm’s purposes and 
securing regulatory compliance?185  
Further, people tend to take the path of least resistance. As regulatory reforms 
targeted at changing micro constituent behaviour requires them to make an effort to 
recognise a new framing of their roles, and take steps to undertake new procedures, 
would they rely on minimal compliance and box-ticking? 186 What is the risk of under-
achievement of the governance capacity of micro-constituents and would substantive 
outcomes be affected micro-constituents187 Further, people also tend to be risk-
averse, and regulatory reforms targeting micro-constituents, which often augment 
their personal liability, may create organisational distortions and unintended 
consequences such as individual defensiveness and blame-shifting within and 
beyond the corporation.  
Excessive Procedural Legalisation - Missing the Wood for the Trees? 
Regulators should avoid being excessively focused on procedural compliance and 
become gradually disengaged from substantive issues of actual corporate behaviour 
and social implications.  
It remains to be seen if the mature form of procedural legalisation in financial 
regulation is indeed an epitome for the development of this approach. Is there an 
advantage retaining a certain extent of open-texturedness or reflexivity? An open-
textured approach emphasises values, ethics and morals which provide strong 
impetuses for individual action too.188 Excessive procedural legalisation may detract 
focus away from the ‘moral message’. For example, the UK Bribery Act does not 
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prescribe the exact systems and controls that are required in excessive detail.  This 
could be one of the Act’s greatest successes, as the Board is forced to focus on how 
the corporation can achieve holistic changes both internally and in relation to 
external partners.  The open-textured element encourages regulators to evaluate 
behaviour meaningfully in light of regulatory objectives and not merely rely on simple 
indicators of non-compliance. Hence there is a need to determine the design of 
procedural legalisation that achieves the embedment of values and not just the 
embedment of procedures that streamline actions and decisions. 
Credible Enforcement  
Further, procedural legalisation needs to be supported by appropriate enforcement 
regimes in order to embed individual incentives and behaviour, which cascade into 
organisational and cultural change.189 In this respect the reforms in financial 
regulation have achieved clarity in personal responsibility and liability, although we 
need more empirical insights from behavioural science as to what balance of 
defensiveness/risk aversion190 is achieved in tandem with more care and ownership 
of personal responsibility.  
However, where anti-bribery is concerned, enforcement is still targeted at the 
corporation. Would the micro-constituents in the corporation interpret this message 
as meaning that the ultimate cost of enforcement is still borne by the corporation and 
therefore no different from a business cost? It is important for regulators to consider 
the design of enforcement regimes in their complementarity with procedural 
legalisation so that the regulatory objectives are not undermined. Empirical research 
seems to support the institution of individual responsibility and liability regimes so 
that compliance can be internalised and enforcement acts as a deterrent to change 
individual incentives. Procedural legalisation has the potential to become a powerful 
regulatory technology. It can de-construct existing legal and power structures in 
order to tease out weak links, pockets of sub-optimalities and perverse incentives. 
Although procedural legalisation in financial regulation is by far more extensive than 
in any other area of corporate sector regulation, it remains to be seen if that is the 
epitome of development in this regulatory approach. There is a need to continue 
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absorbing insights from organisational behaviour and consider what constitutes 
effective enforcement.  We acknowledge that at a certain point, support for 
procedural legalisation has to come from ex post legitimacy. We turn now to discuss 
future directions for research. 
F. Directions for Future Research 
Procedural legalisation offers a new technology in effective corporate regulation by 
targeting micro constituent behaviour and structures within a corporation, with the 
potential of achieving corporate behavioural change and rippling effects to the 
transnational corporate group and its business network. We however recognise that 
insights from organisational behaviour are key to exploring its scope, effectiveness 
and limitations. Hence, we suggest that future research directions (including inter-
disciplinary ones) in this area can be focused on the ex post legitimacy of this 
approach. These include: 
(a) empirical research on the effectiveness of procedural legalisation, measured 
against corporate behaviour,  for example, mapping against decreased levels 
of corporate fines, supervisory events or individual liability;191  
(b) normative research on the optimal means of enforcement complementing 
procedural legalisation.192 
 
Further the ex post legitimacy of procedural legalisation may be examined in a 
broader context in relation to other governance mechanisms such as: 
 
(a) the inherent limitations of procedural legalisation, in terms of insights from 
organisational behaviour and science and/or psychoanalyses of individual 
behaviour; 
(b) how procedural legalisation interacts with the efficiencies, political and cultural 
aspects of organisation design in transnational corporations; and 
(c) the impact of procedural legalisation on private litigation and civil obligations 
such as the development of enterprise liability doctrines. 
 
We also think that procedural legalisation can further theoretical and normative 
research into: 
 
(a) the broader context of regulation theory, such as how meta-regulation should 
be developed; 
(b) the development of corporate law theories and the governance of 
transnational corporations; and 
                                                          
191 Such as Lori Snyder Bennear, ‘Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence from 
State Pollution Prevention Programs’ (2007) 26 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 327. 
192 This is particularly timely given the recent introduction of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in 
England and Wales pursuant to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 for breaches of s 7, Bribery Act 2010.  
The first and, at the time of writing, only UK DPA was approved in November 2015 in the matter of 
SFO v Standard Bank plc. 
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(c) the broader context relating to the distinctions and optimalities between soft 
and hard law as instruments of global governance. 
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